Abstract
Introduction
Mobile agents are program instances that are able to migrate from one agent platform to another, thus fulfilling tasks on behalf of a user or another entity. They consist of three parts: code, a data state (e.g. instance variables), and an execution state that allows them to continue their program on the next platform. For the area of mobile agents, security is a very important aspect since neither the provider of an agent platform or an agent-based service, nor the owner of an agent wants to be harmed by employing this technology. This is a non-trivial requirement in mobile agent systems, as first, the executing party has no vital interest to execute a program correctly, and second, the employer of a program has to give away the control over the execution.
While the mechanisms that allow the executing party to protect its system seem to be feasible today, the protection of the agent, and, in turn its owner, is still subject of ongoing research.
One way to protect agents is to follow an organizational approach, i.e. to make sure that only trustworthy parties execute an agent. Unfortunately, such an approach either severely restricts the agent's autonomy, requires a critical mass of infrastructure in order to be used or disallows a number of advantages of the mobile agent technology. Another way to protect agents is to use special, trusted, tamper-free hardware (see e.g. [9] ). This approach seems to be not attractive since it requires a host to buy specialized hardware that does not fit into existing systems and may not scale up efficiently, If neither organizational mechanisms nor special hardware can be used, mobile agents have to be protected by software means only. Currently, there are two approaches that try to protect an agent from all major attacks. The first approach, which is called Mobile Cryptography [7] , aims at converting agents into programs that work on encrypted data, i.e. the operations use encrypted parameters and return encrypted results without the need to decrypt these data during execution. The second approach based completely on software is called Time-limited Blackbox Protection [3] . Here, the agent code is obfuscated using techniques that are hard to analyse by programs. Since such an obfuscation can be broken by a human attacker given enough time, the agent bears an expiration date, after which the agent gets invalid. Successful attacks before this expiration date are impossible. Unfortunately, both approaches are not yet mature enough to be used.
As long as complete software protection does not succeed, other protection mechanisms have to be examined. These mechanisms will not be able to prevent every attack, but will provide at least protection from certain attack classes. As we will see, one important class of protection mechanisms uses "reference states", i.e. agent states that have been produced by non-attacking, or reference hosts to detect modification attacks of malicious hosts. This paper will examine this class of mechanisms and present the bandwidth of the achieved protection. For that purpose, a new general definition of attacks against mobile agents is presented in Section 2. To allow a practicable protection scheme, the notion of reference states is introduced. This notion allows to realize a whole number of mechanisms to protect mobile agents. After an initial analysis of existing approaches in Section 3, the abstract features of these approaches are extracted. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the general protection scheme is given in Section 4. In Section 5, a framework is presented that allows an agent programmer to choose a specific level of protection using the reference states scheme. An example illustrates the advantages of the framework in Section 6. After having measured the example in terms of overhead, Section 7 concludes this paper.
Attacks, Reference behaviour, and Reference States
In this section, we will examine the question of what an attack against a mobile agent is, and whether and how the answer leads to protection schemes. First, the used agent model is defined.
Agent execution model
In this paper, the following model of the execution of a mobile agent will be used (see Figure 1 ).
The agent is a construct consisting of code, data state, and execution state. The aim of an agent is to fulfil a task on behalf of its owner. For this purpose, the agent migrates along a sequence of hosts. The host takes the initial agent state, i.e. data and execution state, and starts an execution session. In this session, the host processes the agent using the code and some input, producing a resulting agent state. The input includes all the data injected from the outside of the agent, i.e. both communication with partners residing on other hosts and data received directly by or via the current host. The latter e.g. includes results from system calls like random numbers or the current system time. When the agent migrates to another host or dies, the execution session is finished on this host. The resulting state produced by one host is used as the initial state on the next host. Since code and other constant parts of an agent are digitally signed, an attacker cannot modify them undetected.
Attacks and reference behaviour
The term "attack" related to mobile agent protection is rarely defined explicitly, but most often used in an intuitive manner. Since the term is normally understood as a violation of the expectations of the agent programmer or owner we can define attack as follows:
Definition: An attack is a difference in behavior between the attacking host and a non-attacking or reference host, i.e. one that acts as expected ("reference behavior") given the same state and resources (and unambiguous, complete specifications) .
In this definition, attacks include different behaviour due to (unintentional) errors, caused by a misinterpretation of the specifications or by technical faults.
Although this definition seems to be intuitively understandable, the term "reference behaviour" needs more explanation. One can argue that first, no two implementations of a specification behave equally, and second, the behaviour of even the same implementation may differ, depending on external factors, such as e.g. the actual state of thread scheduling. This may be true for a number of systems, but not on the level our notion of behaviour is situated on. We denote with "behaviour" the level of expectation of the agent programmer, i.e. the way the system has to behave in order to execute an agent. If this behaviour differs from the specification, the system acts in a way the programmer did not expect, so it is likely the agent will fail to run. This expectation of the programmer, based on the specification, will probably not determine the behaviour of the system in every detail (e.g. the implementation of integers at the bit level), but is, at an overall level, an adequate model of the system. Therefore, the difference in behaviour cannot be measured automatically on a low level, but by using the knowledge of the programmer to compare two executions instead.
The attack definition above leads to a protection scheme where the difference in behaviour is measured to prove or at least detect misbehaviour. There are two problems that restrict the practicability of this solution. First, some of the behaviour of the host cannot be observed from the outside of the host. In principle, either all malicious behaviour sooner or later results in perceptible actions, or -if the malicious behaviour does not result in a perceptible actionthis behaviour does not matter since it has no consequences. Practically, it is too difficult to control all future actions of a host.
Second, it is at least difficult to provide the reference host with the state and resources of the untrusted host. As a host may e.g. offer a whole database, such a provision would require the transfer of possibly very much data. Additionally, if this data has to be transported from the untrusted host, no one can check the equivalence of this data set to the one stored in the untrusted host.
Reference states
What can be done practically is to measure not the difference in behaviour between an untrusted and a reference host, but the difference in the variable parts of an agent computed from the untrusted host on one hand and a reference host on the other hand, given the complete input during the computation. This leads us to: The input includes all the data injected from the outside of the agent, i.e. both communication with partners residing on other hosts and data received directly by or via the current host. The latter includes e.g. results from system calls like random numbers or the current system time.
If we are able to measure the difference in state, we are able to detect attacks, that differ in the resulting state from a reference state. These attacks include write or modification attacks of the variable parts of the agent and attacks, where the agent code is not executed according to the specifications. What cannot be detected by this approach are read attacks and attacks where the party that mediates input and output modifies or suppresses them.
Analysis of Existing Approaches
In this section, we will analyse three existing approaches that use a kind of reference state to detect attacks by the host. First, we will describe the mechanisms and state the level of protection they offer. Afterwards we will classify them according to criteria like the used moment of checking and the used reference data.
State appraisal
Farmer, Guttman and Swarup present in [2] a "state appraisal" mechanism that checks the validity of the state of an agent as the first step of executing an agent arrived at a host. This checking mechanism only considers the current state of the arrived agent. The mechanism can consist e.g. of a set of conditions that have to be fulfilled after the execution session. In this case, the reference data is structured as a set of rules. These rules are formulated by the programmer who stated relations between certain elements of the state. The check is done by the host that received an agent, and it is in the interest of this host to do so as it wants to execute only valid, i.e. untampered agents (which else might attack him). If the host does not check the agent (e.g. because the host collaborates with the attacking host), an attack against an agent cannot be detected.
The question of which further attacks cannot be detected depends partly on the used checking mechanism. If e.g. for the conditions, only boolean and numerical operators are used (i.e. constructs that are not turing complete), there are computations that can be done by programs, but not by conditions. Therefore, there may be computations that cannot be checked by this kind of rules. The lack of the input to the agent also leads to attacks that cannot be detected. Imagine e.g. an agent that remotely receives prices for a good from different shops. Then a lowest price is computed and the other prices are removed. The host may modify the execution and/or the prices at its will without being detected as it is impossible to find an inconsistency in the resulting state without the used prices.
Server replication
In [6] , Minsky et al. propose to use a fault tolerance mechanism to also detect attacks by malicious hosts. The authors assume for every stage, i.e. an execution session on one host, a set of independent, replicated hosts, i.e. hosts that offer the same set of resources (e.g. the same data), but do not share the same interest in attacking a host (e.g. because they are operated by different organizations). Every execution step is processed in parallel by all replicated hosts. After the execution, the hosts vote about the result of the step. At all hosts of the next step, the votes (i.e. the resulting agent states) are collected. The executions with the most votes wins, and the next step is executed. Obviously, even (n/2 -1) malicious hosts can be tolerated. From our point of view, this means that an execution is checked by using a set of other executions, and by counting the number of equal results. Since the hosts work in parallel, the input to the agent has to be shared and one host must not be able to hold back input to the other hosts.
The server replication approach can detect all attacks that result in a different agent state. Collaboration attacks of up to (n/2 -1) malicious hosts of the same step can be detected. Additionally, even attacks between collaborating hosts of different steps can be found as long as the above condition holds.
Execution traces
Apart from checking the inherent integrity of agents or comparing agent states resulting from parallel execution, the third major idea to check the execution of an agent is to let the executing host produce an execution protocol or trace. In [8] , Vigna presents an approach that uses this idea to allow an agent owner to check the execution sessions at different hosts when a fraud is suspected. For this purpose, every host records a trace that looks like the one in Figure  2b .
A trace consists of pairs (n,s) where n denotes the identifier of the executed code statement. In case this statement modifies the state of the agent using information from the outside of the agent (i.e. "input" in our terms), s denotes the list of variable-value pairs that state the content of these variables after executing this statement.
After the execution, the host creates a hash of the trace and a hash of the resulting agent state. Theses hashes are signed by the host and are sent to the next host, together with the code and state of the agent. The trace itself has to be stored by the host. The agent continues to fulfil its task and returns to its home host afterwards. Now, the agent owner can decide whether he/she wants to check the agent or not. In case of a suspicion, he/she requests the traces from the corresponding hosts starting at the first host. First, he/she computes a hash of the received trace and compares this hash with the one stored at the next host. If these hashes are identical, the host commits on this trace. Then the agent with its initial state is re-executed. In case of statements that used input from the outside, the values recorded in the trace are used. If a hash of the resulting state of the agent on this host is equal to the one signed by this host (which can be provided also by the next host), this host did not cheat, and the checking process continues. The case that the following host pretends to have received a different initial agent state, is prevented by sending back a signed message that commits this state back to the sending host.
This approach detects all attacks that result in a different state as long as the host does not lie about the input to the agent. Note that the owner can only determine which host played wrong, but not the difference in the agent state as only hashes of the final states exist.
Analysis
To obtain a better understanding of the protection bandwidth of the class of mechanisms that use a reference state, we have to extract the generic attributes from the presented mechanisms and the relations between these attributes. These attributes are:
Moment of checking
The reference state can be checked either a) after every execution session on one host b) after the agent has finished its task
Since the overall aim is to identify the host(s) that attacked an agent during its journey, and since malicious hosts may occur anywhere along the route, choosing b) also means that first, the route, i.e. the list of visited hosts has to be stored somewhere in a secure way. This can happen either by dynamically recording the stations, appending this information digitally signed to the agent data, or by sending this information to the owner upon every migration, or by having an apriori, signed itinerary. Second, the used reference data has to be stored for every of the execution sessions, since, without this precaution, the malicious host cannot be identified.
In principle, one could think of checking in smaller time intervals, e.g. on the level of single statements. In reality though, you have to wait until an agent has left a host since a host can always run two agents, a correctly executed one and a manipulated one. Then, the agent that was executed correctly can be used to produce the (correct) checking output while the manipulated agent migrates to the next host. Therefore, using a smaller time interval would not prove the correct execution of the migrated agent.
Used reference data
Depending on the moment of checking, the reference data used by the algorithm might differ. If the execution is checked after an execution session or after the agent fulfilled its task, a combination of the initial state, the resulting state, the input to the session, the execution log and the replicated resources can be used.
Used checking algorithm
Independent from the moment of checking, any of the following checking algorithms can be used (note that the presented algorithms mark only some points in the continuous bandwidth of possible algorithms):
rules This term subsumes simple (i.e. non turing complete) rule mechanisms that allow to check e.g. postconditions in form of first order logic (like moneySpent + moneyRest = moneyInitial). As has been argued in Section 3.1, such mechanisms may not detect all attacks, but often rules are easy to state and to check. Rules may use any of the presented reference data.
re-execution
Re-executions aims at executing an agent according to the reference specification given the same set of conditions (i.e. input) as the execution to check. As for rules, the whole checking process can be automated, 10 read(x) 11 y=x+z 12 m=y+1 13 k=cryptInput 14 m=m+k i.e. supported by system mechanisms. After having reexecuted the specified amount of statements (i.e. one, or a session, or a task), both executions are compared. This can be done either by comparing the "execution logs" that can contain e.g. changes in data and execution state, or by comparing the resulting agent states. Therefore, re-execution needs input, initial agent state, and execution log or resulting agent state as reference data. The power of the approach depends on the level of detail of the execution log. In case of using only the resulting state, the host can lie about the messages sent to communication partners (such as "send $100 to the host"). Even if the log contains such messages, it is not possible to check whether such a message was actually sent by just looking at the logs.
It can be argued that it is impossible to restore the conditions of the original executions for checking as these conditions may include e.g. racing conditions in case of parallel threads (this is no problem for agent systems that allow only one thread per agent). Imagine e.g. that an agent computes a list out of an input, where the ordering of the elements depends on the timing of two threads the agent uses. Then the list cannot be compared simply with the list of another execution as the other list may contain the same elements, but in different order. To solve this problem and the problem that input should be authenticated, a more powerful algorithm is needed.
arbitrary program
This is the most powerful algorithm as it includes the presented ones and allows for more, e.g. to check the reception of messages. Since this algorithm is not known in advance, the system can offer only basic support, i.e. the possibility to execute the program when checking is required. Therefore, any of the reference data may be used by this checking mechanism. The combination of these attributes opens a space of potential mechanisms that is much larger than the three approaches we have seen in this section. If we want to allow the programmer to choose a protection mechanism that is appropriate for his/her specific application, we have to offer him/her a framework instead of a single mechanism.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanisms Using Reference States
As mentioned before, mechanisms using reference states cannot detect all possible attacks by malicious hosts. In this section, we will analyse the bandwidth of the resulting protection, identify applications that cannot be protected and discuss possible extensions.
Resulting protection bandwidth
The protection bandwidth depends on the used attributes. i.e. the moment of checking, the used reference data, and the checking algorithm. A mechanism at the lower end of the protection scale uses only the weakest attributes, i.e. it checks after the execution task, uses the resulting agent state, and employs rules to check the execution. Since the agent is checked after fulfilling its task, a compromised agent continues to work on other hosts. Unwanted actions the agent may have done as a result of the attack in interactions with honest partners can be blamed to the attacker, but it may be difficult to compensate them after the agent returned home. Checking only the resulting states by using rules does not allow to detect all attacks. If a rule e.g. checks whether the initial money equals the spent sum plus the remaining amount, an attack that led to an unwanted purchase cannot be uncovered. Although this mechanism can be performed very efficiently and does not delay the execution on the different hosts, it is not very powerful from a security point of view.
A mechanism at the higher end of the protection scale checks after every execution session, uses all possible reference data and allows for an arbitrary checking algorithm. If the next host checks the execution of the former host, it can be sure to execute an untampered agent in case of a successful check. Since the mechanism allows for re-executing the agent, the computation of a former host is comprehensible. Obviously, this mechanism is more powerful than the simple one above. But its disadvantage is its computational and communication overhead: first, the computation is roughly doubled, and second, the system has to transport one more agent state plus the input at a host.
In case of the detection of a fraud, the question of the consequences remains. In a setting where an attacker can harm a party without consequences, just detecting attacks is useless. Only if legal, organizational or social steps can be taken, schemes like the presented one make sense.
Applications that cannot be protected
Attacks that do not result in a different agent state cannot be detected by using the presented protection scheme. Especially read attacks, i.e. attacks that aim solely at the knowledge of agent data, lie outside the scope, as these attacks do not leave traces in the agent state. If the goal is to achieve a complete agent protection, other mechanisms have to be developed for this purpose. Other attacks that cannot be detected are first, attacks where the executing host lies about the input an agent receives. Second, attacks, where the host forces the agent to do something (like buying a good), and, subsequently, migrates another, not compromised version of the agent.
A Checking Framework for MobileAgents-Systems
In this section, a framework is presented that supports the implementation of a wide range of checking mechanisms using reference states. It provides functionality for employing the generic attributes found in the last section. The idea is to let the agent programmer decide about the check mechanism a host has to execute and to offer basic functionality like signing by the framework. Although it is implemented for the mobile agents system Mole [1] , the presented scheme can be used for nearly every mobile agent platform implemented in Java that uses a weak migration scheme, and offers callback methods in agents to the host. This is the case for most systems. Since we want to support the generic attributes, we explain the framework in relation to these attributes.
Moment of checking
Here we need callbacks for the different moments (see Fig. 3 ), i.e. after an execution session on one host, and after the agent fulfilled its task. The callback for the check moment after an execution session is called checkAfterSession. It is called as the first action on the next host, as it would be useless to check a session on the same host since then the host could also manipulate the check. The callback for the moment after the agent finishes its task is called checkAfterTask. It is called by the last host that executes the agent, often the home host of the agent.
Used reference data
Here we have to make sure that, at the end of an execution session, we have the needed data in a form that allows to check the execution. The initial and resulting states are no problem since it is exactly this portion of data that has to be transported to and from the executing host. Replicated resources are simply objects that are appended to the agent (although this part may be large). To create an input list or an execution log, two ways can be followed. Either this information is collected by a modified Virtual Machine, or written to special containers by code that is instrumented either automatically or manually. Using manually instrumented code has the advantage that the programmer can specify the type and format of the data, which can be more efficient if the checking algorithm is also provided by him/ her.
Finally, we want to choose which reference data will be used for checking. In case of creating reference data by manually instrumented code, this is done by the programmer in the routines that create this data, but if we have automatic support for creating reference data, this has to be pointed out to the framework. This can be done by declaring the implementation of interfaces named InitialStateRequester, ResultingStateRequester, Input-Requester, ExecutionLogRequester, and ResourceRequester, similar to the usage of Clonable in Java.
Used checking algorithm
As the "arbitrary program" alternative is the most powerful approach and includes all other alternatives, it is enough to execute code written by the agent programmer when we want to check an execution. If we want to support the other approaches, we can let the programmer include supporting code. Rules can be supported by encoding the rules manually as program statements. Support for re-execution may happen on different levels. The problem is the question of how the original code can be used for re-execution. First, the code has to be executed a second time using the input taken from the reference input data. Second, output actions can be suppressed as they are not needed for checking the execution. Third, the resulting state has to be compared with the one of the original execution in a manner that can be specified by the agent programmer (due to the problems discussed in the last section). Solutions to this problem include a modified execution environment (i.e. a Java Virtual Machine) that is able to use the reference input set instead (in this case the unmodified code can be used), a copy of the original code, automatically instrumented by statements that do the needed actions (i.e. second execution, output suppression, and state comparison), and finally, a copy of the original code that is instrumented manually by the programmer. To explore this aspect, the last solution was examined for the example application (see next section). 
Callbacks in the agent

An Example for Using the Framework
To illustrate the framework we choose a mechanism that is powerful, and that is not covered by the existing approaches. Using this mechanism we protected a generic example agent and measured the overhead caused by using the protection mechanism. We used as a first step a manual approach, i.e. one where the programmer manually instruments the code to create the required reference data.
Used checking mechanism
A new checking mechanism was chosen to demonstrate that not only the existing approaches described in Section 3 can be based on the framework, but also other algorithms. The mechanism is described in detail in [4] and can be sketched here only roughly.
The mechanism is based on the "Traces" approach by Giovanni Vigna [8] , but uses another moment of checking. In the Vigna approach, the owner needs a suspicion to start checking. In contrast to that, we decided to check an execution session in every case instead of the whole task if needed. For performance reasons, we decided to use the next host to check the execution session of the current host regardless of whether this next host is a trusted one (like the home host) or an untrusted one. This decision has the disadvantage that collaboration attacks of two and more consecutive hosts cannot be detected, but allows to check the execution more timely and to prevent attacks due to the fact that checking happens regardless of whether the owner has a suspicion or not. As reference data, the initial and the resulting state of an execution session are used as well as the input to this session. The mechanism uses digital signatures and secure hash algorithms to authenticate the data a host produces. To prevent an attack by the checking host, initial states have to be signed by both the checking host and the checked host. The mechanism is optimized in the sense that execution sessions on trusted hosts are not checked. Finally the mechanism is able to present the complete state of an attacked agent instead of only hashes of the state, so the owner is able to prove his/her damage in case of a fraud. The checking mechanism puts an overhead to the execution of the agent that can be expected to roughly double the costs of the execution of the unprotected agent (see [4] for a more detailed analysis).
Generic example agent
To demonstrate the framework and the used checking mechanism, a generic agent was implemented. After that, a second agent was created based on the first one, but protected using the mechanism described in Section 6.1. This agent migrates along a path of three hosts, where the first and the last host are trusted, the second one is untrusted. The agent can be characterized by two values. The first parameter determines a "cycle" value, where every cycle means an integer summation of 1000 values. This summation cycle emulates the computational parts of an agent. In the measurement, a cycle value of either 1 or 10000 was used. The second parameters determines the number of input elements to the agent. Each input element consists of a 10 byte string. In the measurement, a value of either 1 or 100 was used. Using these values, four different agent instances were generated and measured: 1 very small one, 1 with almost no input, but some computation, 1 with almost no computation, but 100 input elements and 1 agent that both computed some time and received 100 input elements. These four agents were executed two times: "plain", without using the protocol (but being signed and verified as a whole) and "protected", using the protocol.
Measurements
The measurement was implemented for the mobile agents system Mole [1] , which uses Java as the agent programming language. As a security package, IAIK-JCE 2.0 [5] was used, which offers a pure Java implementation of different cryptographic algorithms. For signing purposes, DSA using a key length of 512 bits was chosen. Table 1 shows the measured times for the four plain agents, Table 2 the corresponding times for the protected agents. The numbers in brackets in Table 2 denote the overhead factor compared to Table 1 . The last column shows the measured overall times, i.e. from starting the execution on the first host to the end of the execution on the last one. The times in the "sign&verify" column denote the time needed to compute and verify the complete message signature. The "cycle" column denotes the time needed for the summation cycles. The "remainder" column finally determines the times for all actions that do not fall into the other two categories.
In the configuration used for the measurement, a plain agent executes its main routine three times, a protected agent four times since one check is required. Therefore, the factors of the "cycle" column range about the value 1.3. The values in the "sign&verify" column change only moderately when using the protocol since signing more data needs not much more time compared to the time needed to start the signature. In the remainder column the protocol has to compare, sign and verify single states. Therefore, this value is much higher for a protected agent.
For the overall values, the factors range from 1.3 and 1.4 for the two agents with an overwhelming portion of computation (i.e. cycle) of over 95% to 1.9 and 2.2 for the two agents without much computation. Since in the measure-ments only migration in one address space was used, no code transfer was needed. Please note that the times were measured without using a just-in-time compiler. By using such a compiler, the times are reduced by a factor of 0.6 for the first two agents and by about 50 for the last two agents.
Conclusion and future work
Security is an important aspect of using open mobile agent systems, especially in the area of electronic commerce. While other problems seems to be soluble today, the protection of mobile agents from attacks by their executing environments is still not completely solved if only software means can be used. One important area of protection mechanisms employs "reference states", i.e. agent states that have been produced by non-attacking, or reference hosts. To allow the programmer to select a mechanism out of this area that is adequate for his/her application, a framework is needed that is able to offer support for these mechanisms. Such a framework has been presented in this paper after having extracted the abstract attributes of three existing approaches that use reference states. To illustrate the framework, an example mechanism has been described that uses an approach different to the existing ones. Using this mechanism, the overhead of using the protection algorithm has been measured for a generic mobile agent. It showed that the example mechanism roughly doubles the costs of the execution while offering a good level of protection in case of non-collaborating attackers.
The presented class of mechanism is not able to prevent every attack, but protects a mobile agent from modification attacks that result in a state different from the reference state. To complete the protection level, another mechanism has to be found that prevents read attacks, i.e. attacks that aim at reading data values contained in the agent. If such a mechanism exists and if it can be combined with the framework introduced in this paper, the goal of protecting mobile agents from malicious hosts is in range of practical usability. 
